This splits the validation code from parsing code, potentially allowing
us to either fully deferring it to the daemon, or to perform validation
separately.
For reference; daemon-side validation currently (docker 29.2.0) produces;
docker run --rm --mount type=bind,src=/var/run,target=/foo,bind-recursive=writable alpine
docker: Error response from daemon: mount options conflict: !ReadOnly && BindOptions.ReadOnlyNonRecursive
docker run --rm --mount type=bind,src=/var/run,target=/foo,bind-recursive=readonly alpine
docker: Error response from daemon: mount options conflict: !ReadOnly && BindOptions.ReadOnlyForceRecursive
Validation for BindOptions.Propagation is currently missing on the daemon;
docker run --rm --mount type=bind,src=/var/run,target=/foo,bind-recursive=readonly,readonly alpine
# no error
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
The daemon already validates the target, so we don't have to validate
if a target is set. Instead, we can ignore empty targets, but produce
an error if a target option was set, but set to an empty value.
With this patch applied, omitting a target option is ignored by the CLI,
but still invalidated by the daemon if the given mount-type requires a
mount target;
docker run --rm --mount type=bind,src=/var/run/docker.sock alpine
docker: Error response from daemon: invalid mount config for type "bind": field Target must not be empty
docker run --rm --mount type=bind,src=/var/run/docker.sock,dst=../foo alpine
docker: Error response from daemon: invalid mount config for type "bind": invalid mount path: '../foo' mount path must be absolute
When passing a target option (`target`, `dst`, or `destination`), the
CLI produces an error if the value is empty;
docker run --rm --mount type=bind,src=/var/run/docker.sock,dst= alpine
invalid argument "type=bind,src=/var/run/docker.sock,dst=" for "--mount" flag: invalid value for 'dst': mount target must be a non-empty value
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Before this patch:
docker run --rm --mount "" busybox
invalid argument "" for "--mount" flag: EOF
With this patch:
docker run --rm --mount "" busybox
invalid argument "" for "--mount" flag: value is empty
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Setting the source and target paths is not tied to the mount-type,
so these tests where covering the same code.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Add a custom join function that allows for non-string slices to be
joined, following the same rules as "fmt.Sprint", it will use the
fmt.Stringer interface if implemented, or "error" if the type has
an "Error()".
For maps, it joins the map-values, for example:
docker image inspect --format '{{join .Config.Labels ", "}}' ubuntu
24.04, ubuntu
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Prior to 1a502e91c9, failing to write the
container-ID to a file would return an error. After that change, we could
end up in a situation where the container was created successfully, but
we failed to inject the `config.json`. This failure would be returned as
an error, but the container was created (but no ID returned due to the error).
This patch changes the error to a warning; while not "ideal" (the container
is created, but in a "partial" state), we also shouldn't consider it to be
a hard failure; proceed as normal, to allow the user to either use the
container as-is, or to delete the container and try again.
Alternatively, we could join these errors, but the result will be ambiguous
in either case (container created, but an error occurred after the fact).
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Ignore errors when trying to remove a CID-file that no longer exists;
also remove the path from the custom error as os.Remove already returns
a os.PathError, which includes the path.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Include the container-ID in the error message when failing to write
the ID to a file, so that the user can still find the ID of the container
that was created.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This releases includes 6 security fixes following the security policy:
- archive/zip: denial of service when parsing arbitrary ZIP archives
archive/zip used a super-linear file name indexing algorithm that is invoked the first time a file in an archive is opened. This can lead to a denial of service when consuming a maliciously constructed ZIP archive.
Thanks to Thanks to Jakub Ciolek for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-61728 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/77102.
- net/http: memory exhaustion in Request.ParseForm
When parsing a URL-encoded form net/http may allocate an unexpected amount of
memory when provided a large number of key-value pairs. This can result in a
denial of service due to memory exhaustion.
Thanks to jub0bs for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-61726 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/77101.
- crypto/tls: Config.Clone copies automatically generated session ticket keys, session resumption does not account for the expiration of full certificate chain
The Config.Clone methods allows cloning a Config which has already been passed
to a TLS function, allowing it to be mutated and reused.
If Config.SessionTicketKey has not been set, and Config.SetSessionTicketKeys has
not been called, crypto/tls will generate random session ticket keys and
automatically rotate them. Config.Clone would copy these automatically generated
keys into the returned Config, meaning that the two Configs would share session
ticket keys, allowing sessions created using one Config could be used to resume
sessions with the other Config. This can allow clients to resume sessions even
though the Config may be configured such that they should not be able to do so.
Config.Clone no longer copies the automatically generated session ticket keys.
Config.Clone still copies keys which are explicitly provided, either by setting
Config.SessionTicketKey or by calling Config.SetSessionTicketKeys.
This issue was discoverd by the Go Security team while investigating another
issue reported by Coia Prant (github.com/rbqvq).
Additionally, on the server side only the expiration of the leaf certificate, if
one was provided during the initial handshake, was checked when considering if a
session could be resumed. This allowed sessions to be resumed if an intermediate
or root certificate in the chain had expired.
Session resumption now takes into account of the full chain when determining if
the session can be resumed.
Thanks to Coia Prant (github.com/rbqvq) for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-68121 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/77113.
- cmd/go: bypass of flag sanitization can lead to arbitrary code execution
Usage of 'CgoPkgConfig' allowed execution of the pkg-config
binary with flags that are not explicitly safe-listed.
To prevent this behavior, compiler flags resulting from usage
of 'CgoPkgConfig' are sanitized prior to invoking pkg-config.
Thank you to RyotaK (https://ryotak.net) of GMO Flatt Security Inc.
for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-61731 and go.dev/issue/77100.
- cmd/go: unexpected code execution when invoking toolchain
The Go toolchain supports multiple VCS which are used retrieving modules and
embedding build information into binaries.
On systems with Mercurial installed (hg) downloading modules (e.g. via go get or
go mod download) from non-standard sources (e.g. custom domains) can cause
unexpected code execution due to how external VCS commands are constructed.
On systems with Git installed, downloading and building modules with malicious
version strings could allow an attacker to write to arbitrary files on the
system the user has access to. This can only be triggered by explicitly
providing the malicious version strings to the toolchain, and does not affect
usage of @latest or bare module paths.
The toolchain now uses safer VCS options to prevent misinterpretation of
untrusted inputs. In addition, the toolchain now disallows module version
strings prefixed with a "-" or "/" character.
Thanks to splitline (@splitline) from DEVCORE Research Team for reporting this
issue.
This is CVE-2025-68119 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/77099.
- crypto/tls: handshake messages may be processed at the incorrect encryption level
During the TLS 1.3 handshake if multiple messages are sent in records that span
encryption level boundaries (for instance the Client Hello and Encrypted
Extensions messages), the subsequent messages may be processed before the
encryption level changes. This can cause some minor information disclosure if a
network-local attacker can inject messages during the handshake.
Thanks to Coia Prant (github.com/rbqvq) for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-61730 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/76443
View the release notes for more information:
https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.25.6
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
Sebastiaan van Stijn
Paweł Gronowski
Sebastiaan van Stijn