Git-based Docker Compose applications skipped the Compose injection
validation that services use. It now runs when the file is loaded or
reloaded, when the raw Compose is saved (UI and API create), and at
deployment before any command uses the file; an unsafe file is not
saved, and a deployment stops with a clear log line.
- All 371 service templates and realistic Compose files still pass.
- Network names may now mix text with $VAR, ${VAR}, ${VAR:-default},
or ${VAR-default} (for example ${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME}_default), so
such existing applications keep deploying; command substitution and
unsafe defaults stay rejected.
- Quote the preserved-repository path in a stat command.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Accept a top-level network `name:` that is a single Compose variable
(`${VAR}`, `${VAR:-default}`, `${VAR-default}`), e.g. for external
networks that differ per server. The default must still be a valid
network name; surrounding text, nested variables, and shell syntax
are still rejected.
When parsing services, such variables are created as service
environment variables (seeded with the default) so users can view and
change them, while the compose file keeps the variable for Compose to
resolve from .env at deployment. Existing values are preserved on
re-parse.
This commit addresses a critical security issue where malicious Docker Compose
data was being saved to the database before validation occurred.
Problem:
- Service models were saved to database first
- Validation ran afterwards during parse()
- Malicious data persisted even when validation failed
- User saw error but damage was already done
Solution:
1. Created validateDockerComposeForInjection() to validate YAML before save
2. Added pre-save validation to all Service creation/update points:
- Livewire: DockerCompose.php, StackForm.php
- API: ServicesController.php (create, update, one-click)
3. Validates service names and volume paths (string + array formats)
4. Blocks shell metacharacters: backticks, $(), |, ;, &, >, <, newlines
Security fixes:
- Volume source paths (string format) - validated before save
- Volume source paths (array format) - validated before save
- Service names - validated before save
- Environment variable patterns - safe ${VAR} allowed, ${VAR:-$(cmd)} blocked
Testing:
- 60 security tests pass (176 assertions)
- PreSaveValidationTest.php: 15 tests for pre-save validation
- ValidateShellSafePathTest.php: 15 tests for core validation
- VolumeSecurityTest.php: 15 tests for volume parsing
- ServiceNameSecurityTest.php: 15 tests for service names
Related commits:
- Previous: Added validation during parse() phase
- This commit: Moves validation before database save
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Andras BacsaiandClaude Opus 5.5