Sentry self-hosted (getsentry/self-hosted 26.8.0) could not be deployed
as a Docker Compose application. Three separate problems blocked it:
- YAML collection aliases: the first fix raised the limit to 256 only in
Application::oldRawParser(). The safety check added in v4.4.0
(validateDockerComposeForInjection) and all other Compose parse calls
still used the Symfony default of 128, so the Sentry file (133 aliases)
failed with "Maximum number of collection aliases (128) exceeded".
Add parseDockerComposeYaml() and use it for every Compose parse.
- Argument list too long: the deployment job sent the generated Compose
file as base64 inside the SSH command. Linux limits one argument to
128 KiB, and the Sentry file is about 370 KB. execute_remote_command()
now accepts an 'input' key that streams content over SSH stdin, and
the job writes the Compose file with it.
- A list-style build arg without a value (build.args: [SENTRY_IMAGE])
merged into a map environment kept its numeric key, so Docker Compose
rejected the file with "non-string key in ...environment: 0". It now
becomes NAME with no value, as in Compose.
Closes#11725
Allow full, anonymized, or disabled IP recording per server through the UI
and API, and pass the selected mode to Sentinel. Adapt traffic breakdowns
to the effective IP mode, including views that aggregate multiple servers.
Check enabled volume backup schedules hourly and notify teams when no
execution occurs within the configured number of days. Expose the alert
threshold in the UI and API, with alerts disabled by default.
Route volume backup results and warnings to the appropriate Telegram
backup threads.
Since aabd12737 a Compose bind volume with a content block had to stay
inside the resource directory. Services and Compose applications saved
in v4.3.23 with other paths, and Git Compose files with them, no longer
started or deployed.
Only admins and owners can edit Compose files, and they can already
write any host file with a plain bind mount, so the rule added no
security.
- Write content files to their host path again, as in v4.3.23
- Keep shell escaping and the safe-character checks on volume sources,
so injection attempts are still rejected
Every released Sentinel with traffic analytics (1.0.0 and later) has
the dashboard and series routes and the requests, bytes_in and app
fields, so the fallbacks for builds without them are not needed.
- Keep "no data" handling for Sentinel without traffic routes (0.0.x)
- Keep the resource-scope fallback, which Sentinel 1.0.1 needs
A staged upload always won over a server path, so an old upload that
was never imported could be restored instead of the chosen file.
- Record the selected source (checked server file or finished upload)
and import only from it
- Delete a stale staged upload when another source is used
Integration token, cloud provider token and cloud-init script edits
were audit-logged under the session team. After a team switch in
another tab, the owning team missed the entry and the other team saw
the resource name.
- Use the team of the edited resource for every audit row
- Remove credentials, query and fragment from secret manager base URLs
in the audit log
- /security/cloud-tokens returns 403 for members instead of crashing
on a null token list
- /settings/oauth redirects non-admins to the dashboard; it used the
missing route "home" and a wrong redirect return type
Login no longer accepts invitations, so the dashboard lists the
unexpired invitations for the user's email with a link to the
invitation page, where the user accepts them.
The domain rows of applications and previews, and the DNS validation
flags of application and service domains, were not locked. A user
could change them from the browser to skip the DNS check or store
fake DNS results.
An admin of the root team could delete the root user (id 0) and the
owners of the root team from the user list.
- Never delete the root user here
- Refuse a user whose root-team role is higher than the caller's
- Refuse the caller's own account; the profile has its own flow
- A queued deployment on a deleted server no longer stops the queue;
one deployment that fails to start does not stop the others
- Cancelling a deployment starts the queued deployments of the same
application on all servers, as a finished deployment does
When the user had no session team (for example after removal from the
team), the audit log page threw an error and returned 500.
- Return 403 when there is no session team or the user is not an admin
- SecretManagerLinks: validate settings when the integration token
changes, and save only validated keys
- Service Domains: lock domainRows
- Server DockerImages: lock images
These paths used the session team after the resource was loaded. After a
team switch in another tab they used the wrong team or denied access.
- ImportForm: use the database team for the server, S3 storages, and
the import
- SQLite ConnectApplication: list applications of the database team
- IntegrationTokenPolicy: check admin of the token team for view,
update, and delete
Subscription actions ran on the session team without a role check. A user
who switched the session to a team where they are only a member could
cancel, refund, or change that team's subscription.
- Lock the team id at mount and require admin or owner of that team
- Check the locked team and the role again in every billing action
- Reject actions after the session switched to another team
Check start prerequisites in database and deploy APIs and MCP controls.
Return HTTP 422 for blocked API starts and restarts. Show restart notices
and open UI logs only after an operation is queued.
Add API regression tests for blocked ClickHouse starts and restarts.
Scope resource permissions and related records to the owning team across
team switches, cloning, deployments, and resource operations.
Merge ClickHouse volume mounts, preserve anonymous data volumes on stop,
and require adopting current data before starting or restarting.
Fix file storage deletion checks and add regression coverage.
- Hide proxy configuration contents from users without update permission.
- Select and validate backup S3 storage against the resource's team.
- Keep scheduled branch syncs green while a conflict PR remains open.
- Document external mount permissions and Sentinel traffic limits.
- Add regression coverage for authorization and backup storage selection.
Require deploy or root token access when creating managed mounts outside
resource directories or changing their file contents through the API.
Synchronize KeyDB and Dragonfly passwords with local and shared
REDIS_PASSWORD values while preserving secret manager resolution.
Allow validated host file and directory mounts outside resource directories
while protecting external paths from deletion.
Clean up cancelled deployment containers and clear tracked process IDs.
Preserve legacy KeyDB and Dragonfly password parsing, accept server backup
paths without extension restrictions, and allow Compose variable proxy ports.