A non-root SSH user cannot open redirects, expand globs, or cd into
/data/coolify (9999:root 0700). Several remote commands relied on that
and failed on non-root servers.
- Write README files with `tee` instead of shell redirects in database
starts and application deployments
- Clear Postgres init scripts with `find` instead of a glob
- Split the proxy config backfill if/else so each branch gets sudo
- Start the log drain with `docker compose -f` instead of `cd`
- Wrap the preserved-repository compose start in `sh -c` for non-root
- Stage clone archives outside /data/coolify via StagesCloneArchives
- Extend the sudo parser and add non-root command tests
Import now always claims the server and rebinds Sentinel. Remove the
SSH-written ownership file, the write_remote/rebind_sentinel/claim
options, and the POST /servers/{uuid}/claim endpoint. The migrator now
fails when the target cannot take management. Disabling management
records transfer.management_disabled so the server shows as
transferable, and the transfer and import pages are simplified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a Management ownership switch to the server page, shown only in
development, that lets a user with update permission release or claim
control of a server from this Coolify instance. Claiming is blocked for
localhost and when the team is over its server limit. Both actions are
recorded in the audit log.
When ServerTransferClaimer claims a server, it now clears force_disabled
if the team is within its server limit, and it always saves settings,
not only when the sentinel is rebound.
Remove the enable/disable toggle from the server UI, logs page, and
Sentinel API so is_sentinel_enabled is derived and read-only. Enable
existing regular servers via migration, start Sentinel after validate-
and-install, and drop the daily ServerManagerJob restart.