- Require write access on the target environment to clone or move a resource
- Check read access on shared variables before a reference is added or resolved
- Limit team credentials, git sources, and imports of other backups to team-wide writers
- Require the delete level for backup, volume, storage, and task deletes
- Require create access for previews, new projects, and git sources
- Use the token team for the access scope, and check team-wide access on Livewire updates
- Require instance admin to toggle the API and MCP server
- Hide server pickers and broadcast details from members without access
Since GitHub App and GitLab API calls use the outbound URL guard,
GitHub Enterprise or GitLab on a private network failed with "Webhook
URL resolved to an unsafe IP address" unless an admin allow-listed it.
On self-hosted instances, Git source URLs and requests now allow
private (RFC 1918), CGNAT (100.64/10, Tailscale), and IPv6 unique local
addresses, plus internal hostnames such as .internal, .local, and
container names. Loopback, localhost, link-local (cloud metadata),
0.0.0.0, and other reserved targets stay blocked. Redirects stay off
and DNS stays pinned. Coolify Cloud and all other outbound URLs keep
the strict rules.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Match the GitHub create modal layout: intro copy, name/group row,
system-wide warning, self-hosted accordion (URL/API/SSH), and a
bottom Continue button instead of a duplicate header Save.
Adds self-hosted GitLab OAuth sources so Coolify can connect to a self-managed GitLab instance, list private repositories, clone over an OAuth token, and deploy (the GitLab counterpart to GitHub Apps).
Hardening: authenticated, one-time team-bound OAuth callback state; token redaction in deploy logs; custom host port/path kept in clone and ls-remote URLs; submodule OAuth auth; system-wide source selection. Covered by unit and feature tests.
cosigned by OpenAI Codex at M1 Max
Andras Bacsai
Mike Chong