Add a manually dispatched workflow for maintainers to sync a Docker
release branch to a selected release tag.
The sync-release-branch job checks out the release branch, computes
the list of unmerged tags up to the requested tag via
scripts/unmerged-tags, merges them in order via scripts/sync-branch
using git merge --no-ff (resolving conflicts by taking the tag's
content), then pushes the result to a temporary branch.
The push-release-branch job runs after manual approval via the
docker-releases environment. It verifies that neither the release
branch nor the temporary branch moved since the sync job ran before
force-advancing the release branch and deleting the temporary branch.
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 182f56fe8c)
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
As a follow-up, we should use the full version (major.minor.patch).
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 97b9e04a94)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
- commit e8dc2fce32 modernized loops to
range over int, which requires go1.22 or later.
- commit 85ebca52fd modernized code to
use stdlib min/max, which requires go1.21 or later.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 9a471180cb)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
go1.25.8 (released 2026-03-05) includes security fixes to the html/template,
net/url, and os packages, as well as bug fixes to the go command, the compiler,
and the os package. See the Go 1.25.8 milestone on our issue tracker for details.
- 1.25.8 https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.25.8+label%3ACherryPickApproved
- diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.25.7...go1.25.8
- 1.26.1 https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.26.1+label%3ACherryPickApproved
- diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.26.0...go1.26.1
---
We have just released Go versions 1.26.1 and 1.25.8, minor point releases.
These releases include 5 security fixes following the security policy:
crypto/x509: incorrect enforcement of email constraints
- When verifying a certificate chain which contains a certificate containing
multiple email address constraints (composed of the full email address) which
share common local portions (the portion of the address before the '@'
character) but different domain portions (the portion of the address after the
'@' character), these constraints will not be properly applied, and only the
last constraint will be considered.
This can allow certificates in the chain containing email addresses which are
either not permitted or excluded by the relevant constraints to be returned by
calls to Certificate.Verify. Since the name constraint checks happen after chain
building is complete, this only applies to certificate chains which chain to
trusted roots (root certificates either in VerifyOptions.Roots or in the system
root certificate pool), requiring a trusted CA to issue certificates containing
either not permitted or excluded email addresses.
This issue only affects Go 1.26.
Thanks to Jakub Ciolek for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2026-27137 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/77952.
- crypto/x509: panic in name constraint checking for malformed certificates
Certificate verification can panic when a certificate in the chain has an empty
DNS name and another certificate in the chain has excluded name constraints.
This can crash programs that are either directly verifying X.509 certificate
chains, or those that use TLS.
Since the name constraint checks happen after chain building is complete, this
only applies to certificate chains which chain to trusted roots (root
certificates either in VerifyOptions.Roots or in the system root certificate
pool), requiring a trusted CA to issue certificates containing malformed DNS
names.
This issue only affects Go 1.26.
Thanks to Jakub Ciolek for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2026-27138 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/77953.
- html/template: URLs in meta content attribute actions are not escaped
Actions which insert URLs into the content attribute of HTML meta tags are not
escaped. This can allow XSS if the meta tag also has an http-equiv attribute
with the value "refresh".
A new GODEBUG setting has been added, htmlmetacontenturlescape, which can be
used to disable escaping URLs in actions in the meta content attribute which
follow "url=" by setting htmlmetacontenturlescape=0.
This is CVE-2026-27142 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/77954.
- net/url: reject IPv6 literal not at start of host
The Go standard library function net/url.Parse insufficiently
validated the host/authority component and accepted some invalid URLs
by effectively treating garbage before an IP-literal as ignorable.
The function should have rejected this as invalid.
To prevent this behavior, net/url.Parse now rejects IPv6 literals
that do not appear at the start of the host subcomponent of a URL.
Thanks to Masaki Hara (https://github.com/qnighy) of Wantedly.
This is CVE-2026-25679 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/77578.
- os: FileInfo can escape from a Root
On Unix platforms, when listing the contents of a directory using
File.ReadDir or File.Readdir the returned FileInfo could reference
a file outside of the Root in which the File was opened.
The contents of the FileInfo were populated using the lstat system
call, which takes the path to the file as a parameter. If a component
of the full path of the file described by the FileInfo is replaced with
a symbolic link, the target of the lstat can be directed to another
location on the filesystem.
The impact of this escape is limited to reading metadata provided by
lstat from arbitrary locations on the filesystem. This could be used
to probe for the presence or absence of files as well as gleaning
metadata like file sizes, but does not permit reading or writing files
outside the root.
The FileInfo is now populated using fstatat.
Thank you to Miloslav Trmač of Red Hat for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2026-27139 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/77827.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit f7d83cbae8)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Paweł Gronowski
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