56 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Andras Bacsai 7bbd91175f Revert "Merge branch 'next' into main"
This reverts commit 2598f3e4c8, reversing
changes made to 83f1a2e503.
2026-08-21 12:12:56 +02:00
github-actions[bot] cd1e595492 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into next 2026-08-20 07:35:24 +00:00
Andras Bacsai 680071dca8 fix(teams): restrict deletion to owners and backfill team ownership 2026-08-20 09:32:32 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 81227670e6 Reapply "Merge origin/next into main"
This reverts commit 15359833d3.
2026-08-19 12:39:55 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 15359833d3 Revert "Merge origin/next into main"
This reverts commit 541d743907, reversing
changes made to bb1d3f13f2.
2026-08-19 12:33:16 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 541d743907 Merge origin/next into main 2026-08-19 12:30:09 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 34da7232aa fix(api-tokens): scope token access to current team (#11396) 2026-08-19 11:27:23 +02:00
Andras Bacsai da8665330b feat(security): add integration token editing and rotation 2026-08-18 16:24:53 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 85e0821dd4 Merge branch 'main' into third-party-integration-tokens 2026-08-18 16:15:53 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 743f54b317 feat(security): add Cloudflare integration token management
Add encrypted team-scoped integration token storage, admin UI, authorization, and Cloudflare token validation.
2026-08-18 16:15:34 +02:00
Helge SverreandAndras Bacsai 8170798115 fix(security): enforce team-scoped authorization for scheduled tasks (#11239)
Co-authored-by: Andras Bacsai <5845193+andrasbacsai@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-18 16:01:17 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 76030a30d4 chore(v5): archive V5 implementation and remove runtime integration
Move V5 source, migrations, UI, scripts, and tests into documentation, then remove V5 routes, models, jobs, configuration, dependencies, and application hooks.
2026-08-15 19:13:30 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 5b370713c3 fix(sources): prevent 500 when deleting GitLab/GitHub apps
After delete, Livewire still re-renders the source change view (modal
$refresh / morph). Policy @can checks then call isAdminOfTeam() with a
null team_id and throw a TypeError (HTTP 500) before the redirect.

Guard null team_id in GitlabAppPolicy and GithubAppPolicy, clear the
Livewire model after delete, and skip @can when the model is gone.
2026-08-01 18:34:38 +02:00
Andras Bacsai e560bdf9e0 fix(api): secure proxy config, clone volumes, and rollback tags (#11003) 2026-07-22 14:52:11 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 6f557cf17f fix(security): enforce GitLab App authorization parity with GitHub
GitlabAppPolicy previously allowed any authenticated user to update,
delete, and create GitLab sources. Align it with GithubAppPolicy, require
Application create authorization on the private-repo wizard, and reject
OAuth callbacks from non-admins so members cannot escalate privileges.
2026-07-20 23:21:40 +02:00
Mike Chong a26091de0a feat: self-hosted GitLab Apps OAuth integration
Adds self-hosted GitLab OAuth sources so Coolify can connect to a self-managed GitLab instance, list private repositories, clone over an OAuth token, and deploy (the GitLab counterpart to GitHub Apps).

Hardening: authenticated, one-time team-bound OAuth callback state; token redaction in deploy logs; custom host port/path kept in clone and ls-remote URLs; submodule OAuth auth; system-wide source selection. Covered by unit and feature tests.

cosigned by OpenAI Codex at M1 Max
2026-07-20 23:21:40 +02:00
Andras Bacsai ae32ab5d7b Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/next' into v5-parallel-inertia-react 2026-07-18 15:57:26 +02:00
Andras Bacsai a4ab69df56 feat(v5): authorize creates, deep-link selection, list apps in v4
Restrict V5 application and resource-connection creation to team admins.
Resolve project, environment, and application from query params and keep
session selection in sync. Surface V5 apps on the v4 resource index and
count them for project/environment emptiness. Create the flux data dir
on install and upgrade.
2026-07-18 15:55:47 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 908b5cc09d feat(api): add service database management endpoints
Add service database CRUD, logs, and lifecycle actions, and document service application operations with OpenAPI tests.
2026-07-15 12:29:58 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 772093928f Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/next' into v5-parallel-inertia-react 2026-07-11 10:06:49 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 95a3c453d8 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/next' into 9249-pr-investigation 2026-07-07 14:45:48 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 51ed86fe63 feat(v5): add coold restart action
Add the V5 server endpoint and UI action to restart coold over SSH with
a fresh host token, plus Flux reconnect handling and coverage for the
new backend, browser, and canvas test suites.
2026-07-06 22:30:50 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 6ae45684f9 feat(v5): add server reconciliation and canvas APIs
Split V5 dashboard behavior into domain controllers and policies,
add agent token rotation/revocation, status reconciliation jobs,
ingress firewall syncing, and canvas connection APIs.

Add migrations for V5 status tracking, server capabilities, resource
connection aliases, and revoked agent tokens.
2026-07-06 17:40:37 +02:00
Andras Bacsai a121386ab4 Merge branch 'next' into improve-resource-route-handling 2026-07-02 13:25:47 +02:00
Andras Bacsai fb2d477e48 fix: improve team resource route handling 2026-07-02 13:05:27 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 7d65a4b496 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/next' into harden-database-import-files 2026-06-29 10:35:35 +02:00
Andras Bacsai d2deaa8363 fix(auth): restrict Sentinel access and register S3 policy 2026-06-15 12:31:30 +02:00
Andras BacsaiandClaude Opus 4.7 6a5fd40a5c refactor(policies): add uploadBackup ability and enforce it on backup upload endpoint
Introduce a dedicated `uploadBackup` ability on Application, Database,
Service, and ServiceDatabase policies (admin/owner only) and call
`$this->authorize('uploadBackup', $resource)` in `UploadController::upload`
so the backup-upload endpoint goes through the same policy layer as the
rest of the authorization refactor. Adds Pest coverage for each policy
variant plus HTTP-level checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-20 11:51:35 +02:00
Bakr 8ad65a0ef8 eat(api): add service-applications API to manage service applications 2026-03-29 06:03:47 +03:00
Andras Bacsai cebef8e258 fix(policies): ensure instance-level databases use root team
Instance-level databases like coolify-db (with id = 0) should always
be assigned to the root team (id = 0) rather than attempting to resolve
their team from the database object itself.
2026-02-27 11:54:22 +01:00
Andras Bacsai b878dc8102 refactor(auth): enforce team member authorization across app
Restrict sensitive operations to admins/owners and hide sensitive data
from team members:
- Add authorization checks to Livewire components and API endpoints
- Restrict team members from accessing sensitive permissions and data
- Hide environment variable values from non-admin team members
- Update policies to enforce team-level admin status requirement
- Add useSensitivePermissions policy for read:sensitive tokens
- Improve disabled button UX with auth-specific tooltips
- Add authorization checks in middleware for API tokens

Closes authorization gaps in project management, server management,
and settings components.
2026-02-27 11:41:01 +01:00
Andras Bacsai 86b05b902a fix(auth): enforce authorization checks across API and Livewire components
- Add authorization checks to API controller endpoints (view, create, update, delete)
- Wrap Livewire component methods with try-catch for consistent error handling
- Add AuthorizesRequests trait to components requiring authorization checks
- Ensure all sensitive operations verify user permissions before execution
- Implement unified error handling with handleError() helper function
2026-02-25 14:20:29 +01:00
Andras Bacsai 1759a1631c chore: prepare for PR 2026-02-25 11:18:46 +01:00
Andras Bacsai 9113ed714f feat: add validation methods for S3 bucket names, paths, and server paths; update import logic to prevent command injection 2025-11-25 16:40:35 +01:00
Andras Bacsai f7427fdea0 Changes auto-committed by Conductor 2025-10-17 23:04:24 +02:00
Andras BacsaiandClaude 336fa0c714 fix: critical privilege escalation in team invitation system
This commit addresses a critical security vulnerability where low-privileged
users (members) could invite high-privileged users (admins/owners) to teams,
allowing them to escalate their own privileges through password reset.

Root Causes Fixed:
1. TeamPolicy authorization checks were commented out, allowing all team
   members to manage invitations instead of just admins/owners
2. Missing role elevation checks in InviteLink component allowed members
   to invite users with higher privileges

Security Fixes:

1. app/Policies/TeamPolicy.php
   - Uncommented and enforced authorization checks for:
     * update() - Only admins/owners can update team settings
     * delete() - Only admins/owners can delete teams
     * manageMembers() - Only admins/owners can manage team members
     * viewAdmin() - Only admins/owners can view admin panel
     * manageInvitations() - Only admins/owners can manage invitations

2. app/Livewire/Team/InviteLink.php
   - Added explicit role elevation checks to prevent:
     * Members from inviting admins or owners
     * Admins from inviting owners (defense-in-depth)
   - Validates that inviter has sufficient privileges for target role

Test Coverage:

1. tests/Feature/TeamPolicyTest.php
   - 24 comprehensive tests covering all policy methods
   - Tests for owner, admin, member, and non-member access
   - Specific tests for the privilege escalation vulnerability

2. tests/Feature/TeamInvitationPrivilegeEscalationTest.php
   - 11 tests covering all role elevation scenarios
   - Tests member → admin/owner escalation (blocked)
   - Tests admin → owner escalation (blocked)
   - Tests valid invitation paths for each role

Impact:
- Prevents privilege escalation attacks
- Protects all Coolify instances from unauthorized access
- Enforces proper role hierarchy in team management

References:
- Identified by Aikido AI whitebox pentest service
- CVE: Pending assignment
- Severity: Critical

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-10-15 11:42:25 +02:00
Andras BacsaiandClaude 7061eacfa5 feat: add cloud-init script support for Hetzner server creation
This commit adds the ability to use cloud-init scripts when creating Hetzner servers through the integration. Users can write custom scripts that will be executed during server initialization, and optionally save these scripts at the team level for future reuse.

Key features:
- Textarea field for entering cloud-init scripts (bash or cloud-config YAML)
- Checkbox to save scripts for later use at team level
- Dropdown to load previously saved scripts
- Scripts are encrypted in the database
- Full validation and authorization checks
- Comprehensive unit and feature tests

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-10-10 19:37:16 +02:00
Andras Bacsai c1bcc41546 init of cloud providers 2025-10-08 20:47:50 +02:00
Andras Bacsai bf884bd1a0 refactor(policy): simplify ServiceDatabasePolicy methods to always return true and add manageBackups method 2025-08-28 17:19:09 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 643343785a refactor(auth): simplify access control logic in CanAccessTerminal and ServerPolicy by allowing all users to perform actions 2025-08-28 10:48:24 +02:00
Andras Bacsai d98b7ab7e0 feat(policies): add EnvironmentVariablePolicy for managing environment variables ( it was missing ) 2025-08-26 21:44:36 +02:00
Andras Bacsai a8d565836a refactor(policies): remove Response type hint from update methods in ApplicationPreviewPolicy and DatabasePolicy for improved flexibility 2025-08-26 16:55:59 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 63fcc0ebc3 feat(acl): Change views/backend code to able to use proper ACL's later on. Currently it is not enabled. 2025-08-26 10:27:38 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 3e1f47a243 feat(auth): introduce resource creation authorization middleware and policies for enhanced access control 2025-08-26 10:27:38 +02:00
Andras Bacsai b5fe5dd909 feat(auth): refine authorization checks for S3 storage and service management 2025-08-23 18:50:50 +02:00
Andras Bacsai adb8f9d88e feat(auth): implement authorization checks for database management 2025-08-23 18:50:35 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 40f108d6e1 feat(auth): implement authorization checks for application management 2025-08-22 16:47:59 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 6772cfe603 feat(auth): implement authorization for Docker and server management
- Added authorization checks in Livewire components related to Docker and server management to ensure only authorized users can create, update, and manage Docker instances and server settings.
- Introduced new policies for StandaloneDocker and SwarmDocker to define access control rules based on user roles and team associations.
- Updated AuthServiceProvider to register the new policies, enhancing security and access control for Docker functionalities and server management operations.
2025-08-22 14:04:25 +02:00
Andras Bacsai d8d01e6886 feat(auth): implement authorization for PrivateKey management
- Added authorization checks in the Create and Show Livewire components to ensure only authorized users can create, update, and delete PrivateKey instances.
- Introduced a new PrivateKeyPolicy to define access control rules for viewing, creating, updating, and deleting PrivateKey models based on user roles and team associations.
- Updated AuthServiceProvider to register the new PrivateKeyPolicy, enhancing security and access control for PrivateKey functionalities.
2025-08-22 13:02:20 +02:00
Andras Bacsai 3ffc751f1a feat(auth): implement authorization checks for server updates across multiple components
- Added authorization checks using the `authorize` method in various Livewire components to ensure only authorized users can update server settings.
- Updated `ServerPolicy` to restrict update permissions to admin users and their respective teams.
- Enhanced security and access control for server management functionalities.
2025-08-22 13:02:11 +02:00