POST /utils/markdown rendered a markdown string to HTML server-side. Its
only frontend wrapper, getHTMLFromMarkdown in src/lib/apis/utils/index.ts,
is dead: nothing imports or calls it, the route is hit by no other code
path, and the path string appears nowhere else in the repo (no direct
fetch, no test, no docs). Markdown is rendered client-side in the UI, so
this endpoint was redundant.
Fully self-contained removal: the endpoint, its MarkdownForm model, the
now-orphaned 'import markdown' in the utils router (used only here), and
the dead getHTMLFromMarkdown wrapper. Nothing else depends on any of them.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /evaluations/feedbacks/all returned the entire feedback table in a
single response (flagged as a Medium OOM risk for admins in
open-webui#22206). Its only frontend wrapper, getAllFeedbacks in
src/lib/apis/evaluations/index.ts, is dead: nothing imports or calls it
anywhere in the codebase. The endpoint is a redundant view-only twin of
GET /evaluations/feedbacks/all/export, which is what the admin Feedbacks
UI actually uses.
Removes the endpoint, the now-unused FeedbackResponse import in the
evaluations router, and the dead getAllFeedbacks frontend wrapper. The
shared Feedbacks.get_all_feedbacks data-layer method is kept, since the
live /feedbacks/all/export endpoint still uses it.
Ref: open-webui#22206
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
These 19 exported wrappers are dead: each appears exactly once in the
codebase (its own definition), nothing imports or calls any of them, and
none has a corresponding backend route. They are leftovers from settings
that were consolidated server-side into /auths/admin/config,
/openai/config, /ollama/config and /api/config:
- index.ts: getModelFilterConfig, updateModelFilterConfig,
getCommunitySharingEnabledStatus, toggleCommunitySharingEnabledStatus,
getModelConfig, updateModelConfig (+ orphaned GlobalModelConfig type)
- auths: getSignUpEnabledStatus, toggleSignUpEnabledStatus,
getDefaultUserRole, updateDefaultUserRole, getJWTExpiresDuration,
updateJWTExpiresDuration
- openai: getOpenAIUrls, updateOpenAIUrls, getOpenAIKeys, updateOpenAIKeys
- ollama: updateOllamaUrls
- prompts: restorePromptFromHistory
- folders: updateFolderItemsById (+ orphaned FolderItems type)
Shared types (ModelConfig/ModelMeta/ModelParams) and all live wrappers
are untouched. Removal is import-safe: nothing referenced these.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reported by bwgabrielsusai on #24719: granting a user only
`workspace.skills` doesn't show the Workspace menu, and visiting
`/workspace` directly bounces them to `/`.
The per-route guard in `/workspace/+layout.svelte` already covered
skills, but two earlier gates in the chain didn't:
* `Sidebar.svelte` case 'workspace' OR'd models/knowledge/prompts/tools
to decide menu visibility — skills was missing, so the entry never
rendered for skills-only users.
* `/workspace/+page.svelte` redirect chain picked the first available
section — skills was missing, so the fallback `goto('/')` fired.
Adding skills to both.
start.sh runs with `set -euo pipefail`, but three call sites added in
070ab2650 (refac: reorganize scripts and ci workflows) reference
optional env vars via bash's `,,` lowercase expansion without any
default. Containers that don't set these vars — the default for every
deployment that isn't explicitly opting into Playwright / bundled
Ollama / CUDA — crash on startup with:
start.sh: line 15: WEB_LOADER_ENGINE: unbound variable
(and the same for USE_OLLAMA_DOCKER, USE_CUDA_DOCKER once the first
were set in turn.) Reported in open-webui#24560 by urbenlegend.
The same refactor correctly defaulted every other optional env var
with `${VAR:-…}`. The three `,,` references slipped through because
bash can't combine `:-default` with `,,` in a single substitution —
`${VAR:-default,,}` makes the default literal `,,`, not what's wanted.
Fix: normalise the three vars in a one-line preamble with `${VAR:=}`,
which assigns an empty default if unset. The downstream `${VAR,,}`
expressions stay exactly as Tim wrote them, preserving the file's
visual style and matching the existing `${VAR:-…}` idiom for "this
variable is optional".
* fix: enforce features.direct_tool_servers on chat-completion tool_servers
The features.direct_tool_servers per-user permission was correctly
enforced on the storage path (routers/users.py user/settings/update,
which strips toolServers from saved settings when the caller lacks the
permission), but the inference path (/api/chat/completions) popped
tool_servers straight from the request body into metadata with no
permission check. The middleware (utils/middleware.py:2799) then
consumed direct_tool_servers to inject system_prompt into the message
array and register external tool specs that get invoked during the
completion. End result: any authenticated user could bypass the
admin-set per-user feature toggle and use inline tool_servers in their
chat-completion requests, even when admin had explicitly denied the
permission.
Default for USER_PERMISSIONS_FEATURES_DIRECT_TOOL_SERVERS is False
(config.py:2750), so under default config no regular user is supposed
to be able to use direct tool servers — making this a real boundary
bypass on out-of-the-box deployments rather than a corner case.
Mirror the storage-side behaviour at the inference entry point: pop
tool_servers from the request body, then silently drop the value if
the caller is non-admin and lacks features.direct_tool_servers. Admins
always pass; users with the explicit grant always pass; everyone else
gets None propagated into metadata, which the middleware already
handles as the no-tool-servers case.
Reported by berkant-koc in GHSA-f582-c373-jjf6.
Co-authored-by: berkant-koc <berkant-koc@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: trim verbose comment on tool_servers permission check
---------
Co-authored-by: berkant-koc <berkant-koc@users.noreply.github.com>
POST /api/v1/chats/new and POST /api/v1/chats/{id}/folder accepted a
caller-supplied folder_id with no validation — neither ownership, nor
existence, nor UUID format. The row was persisted with the supplied
value verbatim, so the DB ended up with chat rows whose folder_id
referenced another user's folder, a non-existent UUID, or even a
non-UUID string.
No read path surfaces this across users — every chat-folder read is
user_id-filtered on both sides — so this is referential-integrity
hardening rather than a security boundary fix. But there's no reason
to accept dangling references either, and the downstream consumers
shouldn't have to assume the column is clean.
Add a Folders.get_folder_by_id_and_user_id() lookup at both writers:
if a folder_id is supplied, it must match a folder owned by the
caller. None remains allowed (chat-without-folder is the default).
Non-existent and non-UUID values fall through to 404.
Reported by ShigekiTsuchiyama in GHSA-4vrg-2vcq-q7jc.
Co-authored-by: ShigekiTsuchiyama <ShigekiTsuchiyama@users.noreply.github.com>
