_sanitize_proxy_path decoded the proxy path once before the '..' check, so a double-encoded payload (%252e%252e) survived the check as %2e%2e and was then re-decoded into '..' by the upstream terminal server, defeating the traversal guard. Decode until stable so no encoded traversal sequence can reach the upstream. Single-encoded payloads were already rejected; this closes the double (and deeper) encoding bypass.
Co-authored-by: sermikr0 <230672901+sermikr0@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add missing custom={true} prop to AdvancedParams in General.svelte and
ModelSettingsModal.svelte so the 'Add Custom Parameter' option appears
consistently across all advanced parameter surfaces.
Also forward custom_params in the General.svelte save handler so custom
parameters are persisted instead of silently dropped on save.
Both presence_penalty and repeat_penalty in the saveHandler read from
params.frequency_penalty instead of their own values due to a
copy-paste error. This causes users adjusting either parameter to
silently save the frequency_penalty value instead.
Thread.svelte: Add null check for messagesContainerElement in scrollToBottom()
to match the existing pattern in Channel.svelte. Prevents potential TypeError
when the DOM element is not yet bound during rapid thread switches.
PinnedMessagesModal.svelte: Move res.length check inside the if (res) block.
Previously, res.length was accessed unconditionally after a guarded block,
causing TypeError when the API call fails and the .catch() returns null.
The SVG-XSS hardening introduced in f5f4b5895 correctly rejects
data:image/svg+xml URIs on new input, but also caused a
pydantic_core.ValidationError when reading pre-existing models from
the database that had SVG data URIs stored as their profile images.
This ValidationError propagated unhandled through _to_model_model and
get_all_models, crashing the entire /api/models endpoint with HTTP 500
and leaving users with no models available in the UI.
Fix:
- Wrap validate_profile_image_url() in a try/except ValueError inside
ModelMeta.check_profile_image_url. Legacy entries are cleared to None
with a warning log instead of raising — the /model/profile/image API
endpoint already falls back to /static/favicon.png when the value is
empty.
- Default ModelMeta.profile_image_url to None instead of hardcoding
/static/favicon.png, since the serving endpoint handles the fallback.
- Add a per-model try/except in ModelsTable.get_all_models so that any
future unexpected validation failure on a single record skips that
model with an error log rather than aborting the entire list.
bypass_system_prompt is an internal flag used by utils/middleware.py and utils/chat.py to skip applying the model system prompt on recursive base-model calls, but it was still declared as a positional argument on the openai/ollama chat-completion route handlers, so FastAPI bound it from the query string. Move it to request.state so external clients cannot set it, matching how bypass_filter is handled.
Drop the argument from both route signatures and read getattr(request.state, 'bypass_system_prompt', False); utils/chat.py sets request.state.bypass_system_prompt alongside bypass_filter and drops the kwarg from the two route-handler calls (the recursive self-calls keep it). Mirrors c0385f60b.
Co-authored-by: anishgirianish <161533316+anishgirianish@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 't0p-s3cr3t' default was dead code on every supported startup path:
start.sh, start_windows.bat and `open-webui serve` all set or
auto-generate WEBUI_SECRET_KEY before the backend imports env.py. It was
only ever reachable by invoking uvicorn directly, which is unsupported
and unsafe (the app would then sign tokens/cookies with a public,
hardcoded key). It also keeps getting reported as a vulnerability because
it looks dangerous, even though it is unreachable in practice.
Drop the fallback (default to '') so an unset key is caught by the
existing WEBUI_AUTH guard, and replace the vague error with a clear,
actionable message explaining that the key is a hard requirement and how
the supported start methods provide it. Exit cleanly via SystemExit
instead of raising a ValueError traceback.
WEBUI_AUTH=False keeps working unchanged (key defaults to '').
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Long usernames overflow the Edit User modal, User Preview modal header,
and the sidebar user area because the flex containers lack width
constraints.
- EditUserModal: add min-w-0 to the flex-1 container so the existing
truncate class takes effect
- UserPreviewModal: add min-w-0 and truncate to the title container,
flex-shrink-0 to the close button so it stays visible
- Sidebar: add truncate to the username display and flex-shrink-0 to
the avatar container to prevent it from being squeezed
renderMermaidDiagram returned raw mermaid SVG, which FilePreview.svelte injects
via wrapper.innerHTML = svg. Mermaid runs with securityLevel: 'loose', so it
neither sanitizes click hrefs (formatUrl skips sanitizeUrl) nor DOMPurifies its
output; a .md file with a click X href "javascript:..." directive (or an
HTML-label payload) therefore executes script in the app origin when previewed.
The chat path was already safe because SVGPanZoom DOMPurifies before rendering;
file preview was not.
Sanitize at the source: renderMermaidDiagram now returns DOMPurify-cleaned SVG
via a shared sanitizeSvg helper (same policy as SVGPanZoom), so every consumer
including the FilePreview innerHTML sink receives safe output.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
insert_chat_files() stored any caller-supplied file_id with no ownership
check, so a user could attach another user's file to their own chat and
then read it through the shared-chat access path in has_access_to_file().
Filter file_ids to those the caller owns, is admin for, or can read.
Also repairs an UnboundLocalError introduced in 260ead64d: the existing
duplicate-check referenced `session` before it was assigned (db=session),
so the function threw on every call and no chat_file rows were persisted.
ModelMeta.profile_image_url now runs validate_profile_image_url, rejecting SVG/script data URIs (matching UserUpdateForm and ChannelWebhookForm). The /model/profile/image endpoint enforces the PROFILE_IMAGE_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES allowlist and sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, so an SVG data URI can no longer be served inline on-origin. Closes the fourth profile-image XSS sink missed by the user and webhook fixes.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Starlette reconstructs request.url.path from the HTTP Host header without
validation. An attacker can inject a path into the Host header to make
request.url.path return a different value than the path Starlette routes on.
The API key endpoint restriction check was using request.url.path to decide
whether to allow or deny access — making it bypassable via a crafted Host
header on any Starlette version prior to 1.0.1.
Fix: replace request.url.path with request.scope["path"], which reads the
raw ASGI scope path that Starlette uses for routing. This value is set by
the ASGI server from the actual request path and cannot be injected via
HTTP headers, making it safe regardless of Starlette version.
Affected code path:
get_current_user_by_api_key() in backend/open_webui/utils/auth.py
(only triggered when ENABLE_API_KEYS_ENDPOINT_RESTRICTIONS is enabled)
References:
CVE-2026-48710 / BadHost
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/05/millions-of-ai-agents-imperiled-by-critical-vulnerability-in-open-source-package/
When called without attached model knowledge and given a caller-supplied knowledge_id, search_knowledge_files passed it straight to Knowledges.search_files_by_id, which does not enforce ownership on knowledge_id. An authenticated user who happened to know a target UUID could enumerate file metadata (filename, file id, KB id, KB name, updated_at) from any knowledge base, bypassing the AccessGrants permission model.
Mirror the same admin/owner/AccessGrants check the attached-KB branch already uses, matching the sibling query_knowledge_files function.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both _get_access_grants and _to_prompt_model referenced an undefined
local variable 'session' instead of the 'db' parameter passed to each
method. Because these helpers are called outside of any
'async with get_async_db_context()' block, 'session' did not exist in
their scope, causing a NameError on every prompt fetch.
The NameError was silently swallowed by the broad 'except Exception'
clause in get_prompt_by_id, which returned None — causing the frontend
[id]/+page.svelte to immediately redirect back to /workspace/prompts
rather than rendering the prompt editor.
Also adds the missing 'logging' import and module-level 'log' logger,
which was referenced (but never imported) in insert_new_prompt,
update_prompt_version, and delete_prompt_by_id.
G30
Algorithm5838
Classic298
Timothy Jaeryang Baek
Amir Subhi
Mateusz Hajder
Sakıp Han Dursun
maco
Kylapaallikko
Shirasawa