generate_chat_completion() checks model access on line 200 only when bypass_filter is
False. When an arena model reaches this function without a pre-resolved selected_model_id,
which is the task and background path (the /api/v1/tasks/* endpoints call
generate_chat_completion directly rather than through process_chat_payload), the fallback
resolves the arena to an underlying model and recurses with bypass_filter=True, so the
resolved model's access check is skipped. An authenticated user with access to an arena
could therefore reach a model they are denied directly, and for the default or exclude
arena, whose candidate pool is every non-arena model, any model on the instance (CWE-862).
The normal chat path resolves the arena in process_chat_payload before this function, so its
resolved model is checked on line 200; the task path was not, which is the inconsistency.
Enforce check_model_access() on the resolved model in the fallback, before the
bypass_filter=True recursion, mirroring the normal-path check. Admins and already-bypassed
recursive calls are unaffected, and legitimate arena use of accessible models is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: rexpository <30176934+rexpository@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two lifecycle/authorization gaps let a deactivated (pending) account keep acting:
1. The background automation scheduler (execute_automation) rehydrated the owner by ID and
dispatched the chat pipeline without re-checking the owner. A user later set to pending,
or one whose features.automations permission was revoked, kept running scheduled
automations on the operator's provider credentials, even though the HTTP create/update/run
routes already gate on get_verified_user + features.automations. Re-gate the rehydrated
owner before dispatch: require role user/admin and, for non-admins, the features.automations
permission; otherwise record an error and skip the run.
2. check_model_access enforced per-model ACLs only for exactly role == 'user', so any other
non-admin role (a pending principal) fell through and was granted access. Enforce for every
non-admin role (admins still bypass), so the check fails closed (CWE-862, CWE-863).
Co-authored-by: rexpository <30176934+rexpository@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The decode-until-stable loops in _sanitize_proxy_path (terminals.py, cap 8) and
_safe_static_redirect_path (models.py, cap 2) proceed with whatever remains after the
cap instead of rejecting it. A path encoded more times than the cap therefore exits the
loop still percent-encoded, passes the literal '..' / prefix checks (the dots are still
%2E, not '..'), and is forwarded to the upstream terminal server, or emitted as a
redirect Location, which then decodes it once more and resolves the traversal. This is
the residual of the decode-until-stable hardening added for CVE-2026-54017: the cap is a
fixed depth, not a true stability guarantee.
Reject when the value is still not stable after the cap (unquote(x) != x), so anything
encoded more deeply than the cap fails closed rather than being forwarded. Legitimate
paths stabilize within a pass or two and are unaffected.
Co-authored-by: DavidCarliez <271374756+DavidCarliez@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: block private-IP webhook URLs to close SSRF on caller-controlled URL
post_webhook(url, ...) in utils/webhook.py forwards the URL straight to
aiohttp.ClientSession.post with no SSRF gate. The URL is caller-controlled
on two surfaces:
- User notification settings under ENABLE_USER_WEBHOOKS=true — any
authenticated user can set the URL their notifications POST to.
- Automation notification triggers (calendar alerts, etc.).
Without a gate, the URL can target cloud metadata (169.254.169.254 /
fd00:ec2::254), localhost-bound services, RFC1918 internal hosts, or any
other private address reachable from the server process. Blind SSRF — no
response body returned to the caller — but enough to enumerate internal
services via response timing / status codes, and on cloud deployments
enough to issue requests against IMDSv1 if available.
Call validate_url() at the top of post_webhook. The function blocks
private/reserved IPs when ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH is False (the
default), is the project's chosen SSRF gate, and is already applied to
the equivalent fetch surfaces (retrieval, image-load, OAuth profile
picture). Operators who legitimately need to webhook to private IPs
(internal monitoring, self-hosted Slack alternatives, etc.) can set
ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH=True — same opt-out as the other gated
surfaces.
Scope intentionally limited to webhooks. The OAuth discovery and
external reranker paths cwanglab also flagged are admin-configured with
intentional private-IP defaults (reranker defaults to
http://localhost:8080/v1/rerank) and are out of scope per Rule 9 — the
admin owns the URL choice and the operator opt-out exists for them too.
Reported by cwanglab in GHSA-5x9f-85cg-w3hf (cluster canonical with six
closed siblings: g36v-23gj-j69x, 6j8f-h58v-xgmw, xpwv-52pm-p8hj,
v9gp-hv2c-9qv8, fw7w-jrw7-p3v9, x7xq-74rg-m8mf).
Co-authored-by: cwanglab <cwanglab@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: also pass allow_redirects=False on webhook post_webhook session.post
Companion to the previous commit. validate_url() only validates the
initial URL; aiohttp's default allow_redirects=True would still follow
a 302 to a private-IP target. Same redirect-bypass class as the rh5x
cluster's five call sites, sixth call site to receive the same gate.
Co-authored-by: cwanglab <cwanglab@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: cwanglab <cwanglab@users.noreply.github.com>
The Qdrant backends implemented delete(ids=...) as a payload filter on
metadata.id, but points are stored with the item id as the Qdrant point id
(see _create_points), and not every point carries an id in its payload.
Memory points store only {created_at} in metadata (KB metadata embeddings
likewise), so deleting a single memory matched nothing and left an orphaned
vector that kept being injected into RAG context.
Delete by point id instead: PointIdsList for the standard backend, and a
tenant-scoped HasIdCondition for multitenancy (point ids are unique, so tenant
isolation is preserved). Filter-based deletion is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The static credentials OAuth flow currently sets scope=None, relying on
the OAuth provider's default scopes. This breaks providers like GitHub
that default to minimal/public-only access when no scope is requested.
This change reads scopes_supported from the Protected Resource Metadata
document (RFC 9728) and uses them in the authorization request. Unlike
the Authorization Server's scopes_supported (a full catalog of every
scope the AS can grant), the PRM scopes_supported represents what the
specific resource requires — making it safe to request without breaking
providers like Entra ID that reject broad scope requests.
Fixes the regression introduced in 349ea4ea where all scope handling was
removed from the static flow.
* fix: gate chat_completion channel: branch on channel access + message scoping
When chat_id starts with 'channel:' the chat-completion handler skips
the chat ownership / storage block below it. Nothing replaced that
gate. The downstream channel emitter in socket/main.py:_make_channel_
emitter writes to Messages.update_message_by_id using a caller-supplied
message_id pulled from form_data['id'], with no membership check, no
write-access check, and no validation that the message_id belongs to
the channel.
Net effect: any authenticated user could submit
chat_id='channel:<any-channel-uuid>' + id='<any-message-uuid>' and
overwrite that message with attacker-controlled LLM output. Cross-
channel writes worked too — private channels, DMs, channels the
caller has no access to. Original author attribution stayed intact on
the overwritten row.
Add the missing checks at the channel: branch:
1. Channel must exist (404 otherwise).
2. Non-admin caller must have write access to the channel — membership
for group/dm channels, AccessGrants permission='write' for others.
3. The message_id (if supplied) must belong to the same channel — a
caller with write access to channel A cannot use this path to
overwrite a message in channel B.
Behaviour change is limited to callers who were exploiting the gap:
legitimate flows that supply a message_id under their own channel
membership continue to work unchanged.
Co-authored-by: sfwani <sfwani@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: trim verbose comment on channel: branch gate
---------
Co-authored-by: sfwani <sfwani@users.noreply.github.com>
The query_memory endpoint embeds the search query without the configured
RAG_EMBEDDING_QUERY_PREFIX, while every RAG retrieval path in
retrieval/utils.py correctly passes it. Instruction-tuned embedding
models (e.g. Qwen3-Embedding) produce poor results without the prefix,
causing memory search to return semantically unrelated results.
G30
Timothy Jaeryang Baek
Andrew Baek
Justin Williams
Chane Lu
James Liounis
Craig